During the third wave of democratization the expectations were directed to the Arab world. Nothing happened even in the time of Western values penetration in the Middle East after the attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan. When the hope was gone a serial of events hit the Arab world in the name of democratization. This process symbolically called Arab Spring that has started in Tunisia was understood as a will of people for the establishment of national sovereign state and final break with autocratic regimes. Those revolutions in this sense are similar and by that the further expectation should be similar. But there is a huge difference which will not take along the same effects at the end. That is a matter of resistant theory and the way of how those revolutions start and which of them use violent means. In our view the revolution in Tunisia has more chances to develop as democratic states instead of Egypt and Libya. The second part of this paper is going to discuss what kind of democracy those states have potential to achieve. Our argumentation in not in favor of liberal democracy. The expectation for democratization of the post Arab spring societies are certainly not excluded, but, with a huge effort of the democratic powers that exist in those societies, assistance provided by Western civilization and with the absence of civil society, expectations towards the democratization of Arab world do not go beyond the creation of hybrid democracies acceptable to Arab tradition and culture.

Key words: Arab spring, revolution, democratization, theory of resistance, rebellion, terrorism.
1. Introduction

Although only a two years have passed from the process that swept the Arab world symbolically called Arab Spring, many conferences, seminars, articles even books are dedicate to this phenomena. During the attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, many scholars expected that the wave of democratization would spread to this part of the world. However, those expectations do not realize. In that time the Arab, countries remained relatively, peaceful and autocratic regimes reinforce its power. It is interesting that for the period in which Arab Spring occur there were not any predictions or expectations. Just happened. Post fest appeared many theses concerning the reasons that motivated the Arabs to rebel against authoritarian regimes. The reasons ranged from a desire for democracy, social justice, to implementation of theocratic state and the rule of Sharia. Besides the reasons that were central research topic in many studies part of the research were dedicated to the success of these revolutions. In most research on this topic, conclusions were derived from the theory of resistance. Although nonviolent revolutionary movements are qualitatively different from violent revolutions, they generally arise from the same conditions. Such movements erupt when there are widespread grievances against the state and elites shift their allegiance from the regime to the opposition. Moreover, certain events – such as a brutal crackdown or an assassination of an opposition figure – often transforms longstanding grievances into moral outrage, which may make citizens willing to act. However, indignation is not enough. There must also be a culture of resistance that situates this anger within a broader ideological critique of the regime. Moreover, there must be mobilizing organizations that can coordinate and direct the rebellion (Goldstone 2009). Whether the goal is revolution or reform, the purpose of nonviolent tactics and strategies is to create a political dynamic that organizes and mobilizes people-power while at the same time limiting and restricting the ability of opponents to suppress the movement with violence and money-power. According to this theory, Egypt, and Tunisia had huge chances for quick progress and democratization, while in Libya case where revolutionaries waged violent resistance predictions were not optimistic. However, not all these analyze that were based on the theory of resistance took in consideration what kind of democratization those societies need. Their divided societies have shown that the greatest debate is underway about the question what kind democracy they need. While the ruling parties are pushing for a new constitutional solutions inspired by Sharia, secular opposition parties stand firmly against. In fact, the biggest demonstrations in these countries after the revolutions were provoked by the actions of governments in supporting the Islamization of state or by the support given to Islamist organizations and movements. So after two years of post-revolutionary period can we still speak about liberal democratization of the Arab society? If Arab states have the desire and capacity to democratize in this sense and if democratic peace theory is, correct, then Fukuyama’s predictions about victory of liberal democracy will become reality. Nevertheless, if we make a conclusions based on winner parties political platforms and their ideologies, problems encountered in post-revolutionary Arab societies regarding the human rights, social politics, pure economies, then the “democratic coup” in Egypt and the existence of terrorist organizations is unlikely that someone should expect rapid transition to democracy and building a stable civil societies.

2. Changes after the revolutions

To answer the question about the future of post-revolutionary Arab states, we must in briefly explained their political history. After the Second World War and the period of decolonization small number of Arab, states had attempted to introduce democracy as a political system. Those states that contained some form of elective, parliamentary, or quasi-democratic political system soon found toppled by military coup (Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan) or have found themselves in the throes of civil wars (Lebanon, Sudan). Others independent states turned into authoritarian constitutional monarchies (Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Bahrain) and there were those who opted for absolutist monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates). In several cases the successful national liberation movements (Algeria, South Yemen), following the example of the socialist state established a one-party system.

In the periods of political transitions of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s a small number of autocratic states resulted in a true democracy. In many cases, old authoritarianisms recycled themselves as quasi-democracies in hybrid regimes that combined the trappings of pluralism and electoral process with deep-seated centers of authoritarian power that remained beyond the reach of popular control. Nonetheless, the era did mark an important change in modern politics. These kinds of quasi-reforms in the Arab world
were typical in the late 80s. Like Mubarak and Ben Ali had liberal promises. Jordan organized the first parliamentary elections, and Algeria announced reforms that were supposed to replace the one-party system. Although this period has attracted a lot of attention but no major changes have occurred (Brynen 2013).

Ten years later, in the aftermath of the September 11, attention was again focused on the possible democratization of Arab world. Western world expressed interest in promoting democracy in the region. In December 2002, the United States introduced the Middle East Partnership Initiative (a series of programs designed to support the expansion of political opportunities in the Middle East). This initiative should be a part of the strategy for promoting democracy in the Middle East. In June 2004, Group of Eight (G8) adopted a declaration of common interest in the reforms in the Middle East and soon afterwards greater foundations were established for research on this issue.

Arab Spring began very innocent in Tunisia, but soon it spilled in most Arab countries. Although this analysis would be useful to be based on a number of N-cases, however we decided to concentrate on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya as examples in which despots were replaced through resistance and new representatives of the citizens were elected. Even those examples look very similar there are some differences. Tunisia is an example of a non-violent resistance; Egypt is an example again of non-violent resistance but only in the Morsi period, while Libya is a case where rebellions ousted Gaddafi by violent revolution and international intervention that was not clearly supported by the UN Security Consul Resolution 1973.

2.1 Libya case – is there possibility to avoid civil war?

In Libya case, after the international intervention the society was literally divided between Gaddafi supporters and supporters of democratic reforms. On 20 October 2011 the main news that toured the world were brutal killing of Gaddafi. All televisions showed inhuman molesting over wounded Gaddafi and then the treatment of his dead body. His murder marked the end of the war, like the mission of the international community was his departure, not protection of the civilian population. Mass media covered the euphoric victory for the Libyan people and salvation of them problems. Was it really so?

How Libya has looked through the numbers? According to the International Organization for Migration in March–June 2011, 350,000 people accepted Egypt, Tunis 540,000, 30,000 Chadian and not more than 500 Italian. In the period from June to September, news agencies again informed for new numbers of refugees. During this period entire towns and villages inhabited by supporters of Gaddafí (e.g. almost the entire population of Tawergha) were cleaned out. Again, rebels for democracy and human rights backed by NATO forces left thousands of people without home but this time.

After a six-month intervention, Libya became heavily armed area, where rebels and civilians (Gadhafi supporters) have heavy weapons. Experience shows that the arming of the population is easily achievable goal, but disarmament is too difficult. If so, it is nonsense to believe that the country can be democratized peacefully. In favor of this claim are benefits that Libyans had in the Gaddafí’s time: free education, free healthcare, interest-free loans that usually were not returned, the average pay for those who did not have proper employment of their profession etc. All these benefits and many others in the 42 year rule of Gaddafi were part of the normal life of Libyans and now they are replaced with rules of raw capitalism and the right to vote as fundamental benefit of democracy. However, who should lead Libya to democracy?

The election results from July 2012 were much divided as society is. On the elections victory, however, bore “pro-liberal” National Force Alliance (NFA), which describes itself as a “moderate Islamist movement that recognizes the importance of Islam in political life and favors Sharia as a source of law (Grant, 2012). On the same course, after the revolution, was the announcement of the Transitional National Council (TNC) that Sharia will be the main source of legislation in the new state. This policy surprised many of domestic and international rebel supporters. In the beginning of the revolutions, those same people were asking for democracy and civil rights (Norris-Trent 2012). So logically, the question that appears is really to the pre-election campaign of NFA: was this campaign pro-liberal or there are different understandings of democratic liberal values in Western civilization and in the Arab world?

Two years after the intervention in Libya’s security situation has dramatically worsened if we compare with the time of Gaddafi. On 29 July Reuters report that the cradle of the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Benghazi has witnessed explosions, assassinations, violent demonstrations and a mass jail break. Hundreds of protesters had attacked the Benghazi and Tripoli offices of Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood and
the headquarters of a liberal coalition in the capital after demonstrations turned violent. In the latest news for Libya, we can read only about the fear and risk of civil war between the ruling Muslim Brotherhood and opposition forces that blocked key oil ports and the capital Tripoli (Stephen 2013). So can we expect democratization of Libyan society or should we wait for another Egyptian case?

2.2 Egypt case – can we speak about democratic coup?

**Egyptian elections** after the nonviolent revolution were related with the elections from 2010. The rigged November 2010 People's Assembly elections in Egypt marked a major political setback for the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood. The group lost all its seats in the parliament and 1,000 of its members were arrested. Left with no access to the political system, the Brotherhood had strong incentives to join the January revolution and support the call for democratization and free elections. This strategic decision indeed paid off for the Muslim Brotherhood (Matesan 2012, p. 27). Their party Freedom and justice party (FJP), leader of the coalition Democratic Alliance for Egypt, won 213 of 498 parliamentary seats, while the whole coalition won 47.2 percent (228) of the seats in the People’s Assembly. Among the Islamists running on elections, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), according to the Party Platform, represents the centrist moderate stream. The more conservative Islamists (Salafi ideology) have united under the banner of the Islamist block, which comprises Al-Nour, Al-Asala party, and the Building and Development Party (Al-Binaa Wal Tanmiyya). Together they gained 24.7 percent of the seats in the elections. Like the FJP and Al-Nour shares the view that Islam offers comprehensive guidance across the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and believes in the supremacy of Shari’ah. More radical is Building and Development Party. This party is strongly linked with the radical Islamic group al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya whose main goal is to establish an Islamic society and re-establish caliphate.

Again as in Libya, the election result was in favor of the Islamists. Although they were part of the opposition to Mubarak demanding democratic reforms after coming to power only democratic reforms that were achieved were elections. The economic crisis that followed the fall of Mubarak, divided society between secularists and Islamists, intolerance towards non-Muslim population primarily towards Copts, announced constitutional change in the spirit of Islam, as well as running regional and international policy by the newly elected President Morsi provoked discontent of the population to grow in mass protests and demand for new elections. While the world believed that Egypt has good chances for democratization and the countries affected by the Arab Spring, despite Tunis this country only managed to start democratic reforms happen coup. This time, Egyptian opposition lead by army supported by Western democracies prepared extraordinary surprise for theorists on civil military relations. Democratic countries, which were supposed strongly, condemn the coup and to stand up for democratic principles provided strange explanations that the coup was carried out in the interest of democratic reforms. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed strong approval of the Egyptian military’s removal of former President Mohamed Morsi. Kerry said the military was “restoring democracy” when it ousted Morsi, which he said was at the request of “millions and millions of people.” From this statement, it can be conclude that the despite United States did not condemned the coup but in a way, they welcomed it in the interest of democratic reforms. Convictions were not officially given nether of any western democracy.

So the question is: Is there a democratic coup?

In a conversation with Professor Biljana Vankovska the expert in civil military relations and international security, she explained as that one of the fundamental (sine qua non) norms of each order that wants to be democratic is precisely the civilian supremacy over the military. Conventional truth in political science is that military coups cannot be democratic because it derogate rule of legally and legitimately elected political elites. Even when military force ousted dictatorial power, their act cannot be perceived as democratic and legitimate, but possibly as temporary instrumental. Euphoria from Egypt brings new winds of thinking, so some authors seek to extend the theoretical and practical assessment of Praetorian, giving democratizing dimensions. They appreciate that in certain circumstances might need a coup to civilian rule, which is legal, but which has lost legitimacy (popular) or inflicted enormous damage on the economy, social peace and interethnic/inter-religious relations. With the takeover, it normalizes social situations (which spun out of control and threaten the normal functioning of the organization and ensuring security) and creates preconditions for the return of power to civilian elites, when it is estimated that there are
conditions for democratic elections. Theoretical analyzes which offer huge empirical material shows that military rule (as an imminent undemocratic institution) do not have democratizing capacity. Some justification for a coup in Egypt can be found in the Huntington’s explanations for military coups. Huntington argued that military intervention in politics should be first understood as a reflection of and response to an extreme politicization of society. According to Huntington, no society, not even totalitarian ones, can govern when every mundane choice has political implications. Precisely in these claims of Huntington Egyptian military has provided justification for the coup against Mubarak, and later against Morsi, explaining that those actions were the only possible response to exceptional circumstances of governance. In other words, the need to set state under control, institutions to function normally and to restore the principle of checks and balance led to this solution. However, in the theory only democratic controls over society (not military ones) can achieve those goals. Although Sissy General announced that the military does not intend to have a political role, however it will have a leading role in restoring the country on the road to democratization, at least at least until the next parliamentary elections. When exactly the elections will be hold, how they will be implemented, who will participate in the elections and in the end who will win that will continue with reforms are important question but the answers are not necessary for this analysis. More important is how the army is going too organized and completes this process taking into account the number of victims after a coup, lost confidence in the army and institutions in the winning parties from the last elections (Muslim Brotherhood Al-Nour, Al-Asala party, and the Building and Development Party), divided society between secularists and Islamists, and poor economic situation of the country.

2.3 Tunisia case – there are some chances, but what kind of democracy they need?

Similar like in Libya and Egypt, in Tunisia the moderate Islamist led by Ennahda movement won 37 percent of the vote, followed by the Progressive Democratic Party with 12.3% and the Ettajdid Movement with 7.1%. In the case of Tunisian democratization of society, have more chances. Ennahda party is generally socially centrist with mild support for economic liberalism. Nevertheless, liberals accuse its leaders of "doublespeak". According to the party platform, they support strong secular, Arab nationalist and socialist principles that predominate among the other parties. Instead, these commitments they allow Islam into public life. Article 28 of the new constitution, which seemingly sees women as “complementary” to, or “associates” of men, that was passed with 12 votes against eight; nine of which came from En-Nahda, provoked the real debate. Shortly after the article was proposed, protestors took to the streets of Tunis demanding full and explicit equality between men and women in the constitution. However, so far there is no hope that the new constitution would be adopted by consensus by the will of the citizens, because again, as in Egypt and Libya, and in Tunisia there is a great divide between secularists and Islamist or supporters of democracy in the spirit of Islam.

The Islamist victory after the Arab spring rise the question: Are Islamist parties will try to establish an Islamic state after coming to power. The prominent Islamist intellectual and head of the Tunisian Islamic El-Nahda party, Rachid Ghannouchi has suggested, “until an Islamic shura (consensus) system of government is not established, the second best alternative for Muslims is a secular democratic regime... [that] respects the fundamental rights of all people without discrimination and without commitment to a religious frame of reference. What matters in such a system is that despotism is averted” (Al Ghanouchi 2002). According to this statement, the post-revolutionary societies of those three states are still looking for consensus which path they should chose. If we make a conclusion from the polls that are done in those societies the majority is in favor of some combination of democracy and state order inspired by Sharia. According to the Pew Global Attitudes survey from 2011 Muslims, believe that Islam’s influence in politics is positive. These surveys consistently confirm that there is a strong Muslim support for popular sovereignty, Sharia, Islamic values and the public role of religion but without falling into a trap of an Islamic state. The Gallup poll from June 2008 found that 68% of Egyptians believe that Sharia law should be the only source of legislation and 87% said that religion is the most important aspect of their identity, more than anything else in the world (Kerchkove 2012). Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) and the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) in August 2011 found that 44 percent of Egyptians want an Islamic state, 46 percent prefer a secular model and 10 percent want a strong state even if it is not democratic. Similarly, a March 2011 International Republican Institute (IRI) opinion survey found that 48 percent of Tunisians want...
a state based on religion, while 44 percent prefer a secular state, and about one-quarter of those on both sides have strong feelings about this issue. So at this point, we are concluding that even all demonstrations were about call for democratization and free elections after the elections we really do not know about what kind of democratization were all those demands. What we know after two years from Jasmine Revolution is that like the previous two cases and this society is very much divided between Islamist and secularist. After the Egyptian cope, the Tunisia opposition seeks for the same way to continue with the process of democratization. The opposition accuses the government of failing to rein the Salafist movement, who are blamed for murdering MP Mohammed Brahimi in July and Chokri Belaid in February, both of them prominent secular politicians. It also wants to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, which is far away from finishing a draft constitution and election law. From the situation in Tunisia we can conclude that two years after the Arab spring Tunisia is facing the worst political turmoil since autocratic ruler Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was toppled. For now, while demonstrations are still not violent there are possibilities for dialogue between the ruling majority and opposition and Tunisia has same changes to get on the path of democratization.

3. How far are Arabic societies from democracy

When we speak about democracy we think about constitutional democracy, separation of powers, pluralism, respect for civil and minorities rights, rule of law and existence of strong civil society. Liberal democracy in other words.

So the first question, regarding the post Arab spring states, that appear is how to move from regime breakdown to democratic reform? According to Huntington’s framework, democratization can be achieved if at least one of the four main approaches is going on: modernization approach, societal equality approach, mass mobilization approach, and the elite pact approach. Modernization approach states that urbanization, high literacy rates, freedom of thought and conscious, more transparent and accessible information sources, and technological advancements lead to democratization in societies (Welzel 2009). Regarding literacy rates, all those three states have high level of literate population, above 75%. The urbanization rate is different. Libya is leader with 77.7% urban population and Egypt is on the bottom with 43%. About the freedom of thought, International human and ethnical union does the most comprehensive report in 2012. In all of those three states, there are serious problems with discrimination law on the religion base. Regarding to accessibility to information sources we done some research in the area of internet accesses by the United Nation publications (there are some improvement but those societies are still much behind compare to the western societies. Therefore, by those statistics Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are not prepared for democratization, but they have some potential.

By the social equality approach, the existence of high levels of inequality among various social groups in the country increases the likelihood of democratization (Robinson & Acemoglu 2006). As such, if a dictatorial society has an egalitarian structure, people have no reason to seek democratization. Conversely, the existence of significant inequality among social groups, such as partial distribution of resources, increases the likelihood that democratization will occur at some point. This is the case in those three Arab counties but here the main question is what kind of equality Arab people need?

Equality has always been related to human rights. Today the term “human rights” has two incompatible meanings. In the non-Muslim world, “human rights” refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that all people — men and women — are guaranteed individual rights. However, when we speak about human rights in Muslim world we must start first with elaboration of Cairo declaration. While most of the Articles are related to the same rights contained in the Universal Declaration, many of them are limited and refer to the interpretation of Sharia. Cairo Declaration divides all human beings into two separate legal persons within its defined categories, namely men and women, believers and non-believers.

The most controversial area in the debate on Islamism and human rights is the rights of women. In general, the Muslim Brotherhood, neither al-Nour nor al-Nahda believe in the concept of gender equality as stipulated in international human rights treaties. Members and leaders of the MB have usually been critical of the concept of gender equality arguing that international women’s rights corrupt Islamic social values and morals, and on the 57th Commission on the Status of Women when the global agreement for prevent and end violence against women and girls has been reached Egypt and Libya among other Muslim countries vote against the conclusions. Islamists advocate the concept of complementary roles for men and women.
This means in reality that not all the rights enjoyed by men are provided to women. The key areas were the women are less equal then the men are the rights on marriage, divorce and political rights. The second disputable area is the debate about the rights of religious minorities. Religious minorities have lately become deeply concerned about their future rights under Islamist rule. Over the last two decades, the MB on numerous occasions stressed its respect for the principle of citizenship and equality between all Egyptians. However, the rights of religious minorities in Muslim Brotherhood thinking remain problematic. The MB’s Reform Initiative of 2004 stated that ‘religious freedom is guaranteed for the recognized monotheistic religions’ (that is, Christians and Jews, also often referred to as the ‘people of the book’). A similar restriction can be found in the FJP’s platform, which talks about the state’s duty to protect only the monotheistic religions. MB leaders have stated that non-Muslim citizens who are not people of the book have the right to live in Egypt, but are not allowed to publicly express their religious beliefs or to build their own places of worship. The platform of al-Nour names Christianity as the only non-Muslim minority in Egypt whose religious freedom is protected.

Speaking about human rights we must not forget and the rights of sexual determination. This issue will wait for better times to be open.

Mass mobilization approach claims that the majority of society believes that they must carry out democratization and they must bring democratic values to their societies through civil resistance, uprisings or revolutions. According to this theory, the middle class and the civil society play very important role in motivating and organizing the masses against dictatorial regimes. Like many terms in political science, civil society has many different definitions and interpretations. In Locke, explanation civil society precedes the state, both morally and historically. Society creates order and grants the state legitimacy. Hobbes defies civil society as an application of force by the state to uphold contracts. Montesquieu was the first who identify intermediate organizations as crucial components of civil society (Katz 2000). In the same line Tocqueville believes that: “voluntary associations fuse personal interest and the common good” and he “hoped that civil society would serve liberty by diluting the influence of any single interest, weakening the majority, and guarding against the excesses of the very democracy that stimulated their appearance” (Katz 2000). In the modern history, Fukuyama defines civil society “as the realm of spontaneously created social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political institutions. The central debate is does civil society develops before or after the process of a democratic transition. There are those who argue that civil society develops after transition, but there have been others arguing that civil society frequently develop before the transition to democratic system. However, both camps agree that civil society is one of if not the-crucial phenomena that takes shape and becomes influential during processes of democratic transition. By the IREX analyses while the number and diversity of the organizations populating Egypt’s CSO sector appears impressive with more than 27,000 registered NGOs, the sector is highly fragmented and most have weak structures and relatively little orientation toward sustainable development. Many civil society organizations have limited financial resources, weak management skills, an absence of transparency and accountability, a lack of internal democratic governance, and insufficient technical expertise and professional staff capacity. In Tunisia, the country’s 2 single-party regimes between 1956 and 2011 used different tactics to ensure that civil society in Tunisia remained fragmented and impotent, posing no serious opposition to their respective regimes (Hopmann & Zartman 2012). After the Arab spring, by June 2011, there were at least 20,000 registered NGOs in the country (Hopmann & Zartman 2012). Nevertheless, most of those NGOs still do not have experience toward sustainable development and there are strong influenced by political parties (Deane 2013).

The issues facing civil society and the transition are very specific to Libya, a country where there has been no constitution, no political system, and no rudiments of civil society. Currently the dominating Libyan organizations are mostly related to the personalities of their founders, while most of the small and youth-led ones are still far from getting enough support and access to CSOs networks and capacity building opportunities. On the other hand, a large number of organizations stopped their activities mainly because they could not come up with a clear agenda and mandate due to lack of experience, gradually decreasing motivation after the end of the revolution, or because they had to resume their regular occupation.

The Elite pact approach asserts that even though no mass support for democratization exists, elites spearhead democratization in their societies for relatively consistent reasons across contexts. These
reasons commonly include enlightened democratization, imposed democratization, and opportunistic democratization. Elite pact approach is certainly not a case for Arab spring countries. By this argumentation, we can conclude that those tree post-revolutions Arab countries are still far away from democracy. We can confirm that they have some potential but not clear picture for future or at least no consensus. Transition means that we know not only where we are coming from, but also where we are headed. In this context, can we say we know for the countries affected by the Arab Spring?

Another one very important question to find out how far away are those countries from democracy is the issue about rule of law. It must be noted that there is a huge connection between the rule of law and democracy. The idea that by announcing plural elections in lawless societies is the right path to democracy usually does not lead to the goal. This claim can prove through historical path to democracy in Western societies. Britain began its way in 1215 with the Magna Charta when newly introduced rights and freedoms defined limits of the Sovereign. This document opened the way to democracy, but it was not a democracy. This was a small example, but the examples are numerous proving that democracy comes after the law, and not vice versa. The rule of law before democracy opens the way to democracy. Democracy before the rule of law is a fraud. This is indeed the problem in the Muslim world. Therefore, to start to build rule of law Arab societies should first start with constitutional and state reforms in the spirit of democracy. However, if we take in consideration that majority of the people is in favor of some combination of democracy and state order inspired by Sharia, than we have to find the answer of the next question. Can the Islamic state, governed by a comprehensive sharia (Islamic law) genuinely accommodate democratic principles based on popular sovereignty? Can the secular democratic state accommodate the spirit of religiosity in the public sphere?

From the above elaboration of the problem, the answer is more or less known. If we speak about liberal democracy, than the answer is no. The principles of liberal democracy are in contradiction to the Sharia law. Thus we should not expect that changes will take place in these societies will be aimed at building democracies in terms of Western democracies. Of course, it is positive that the former Islamist terrorist groups are transformed into political parties with moderate agendas, but cannot be expected that these forces will be the main carriers of democracies changes. The inclusion of Islamist parties and movements within the political mainstream leads to their political moderation as they trade off their ideological rigidity for electoral viability. However, although the Islamist parties that came to power in these societies have removed the word Jihad from their party platforms, they did not fully throw the Islamic ideology. The coming conclusion is the post-revolutionaries Arab societies are in the process of transition to democracy, but so far to democracy in the sense of rule of majority through holding of free and fair elections.

4. Terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world as aggravating factors for democratization

The civil unrest in the Arab world, which has come to be known as the Arab Spring, brought many new challenges to the forefront of geopolitics. Of great importance and concern to the West is the affect that the destabilization of these Arab governments might have on international security and the threat of international terrorist groups in the Middle East. There is a possibility that terrorist groups could capitalize on the weakened political institutions of these countries as they transition to new rule and a more democratic government. Evidence for these concerns comes from the experience of Islamist victories in Algeria in 1991 and Palestine in 2006 (Carothers 2011). Yet, on the other side of the argument is the optimistic view that the upheaval will in fact weaken groups such as Al-Qaeda and may serve to limit their influence in the region. Both sides of the argument present many new challenges for counter terrorism policy, which must be addressed.

The 2011 revolutions undermined the most powerful recruiting message that terrorist organizations had by proving that nonviolent political protest could overpower even the most repressive security states. They have led to the emergence of a new mentality among Arab citizens: hope. In a region here government institutions are disregarded as corrupt and ineffective, the possibility of a genuinely representative government poses the greatest threat to Islamist extremist groups. The foundational core of the group consists of Arab Islamist extremists, many of whom had dedicated most of their adult lives to fighting against the secular ‘tyrants’ of the Middle East and North Africa. Yet, as many observers have noted, the events did not unfold as Al-Qaeda had envisaged and appeared to undermine core tenets of the Al-Qaeda
We are conscious of the current turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, while various components of Al-Qaeda hope to be able to consolidate amid the lawlessness and power vacuums that have emerged in some regions following successful revolutions and in areas experiencing on-going conflict. Equally aware, however, of Al-Qaeda’s increasing marginalization, the group’s media publications continue to strive to present jihadism as the most appropriate way to protect collective interests, eliminate adversaries, eradicate vice and establish a zealously pious social order. (Holbrook 2012).

However, the biggest problem has been how the Arab Spring took a lot of pressure off Islamic radical groups and allowed these fanatics to more easily recruit, raise money, and organize more violence. The revived Islamic terror groups promptly began attacking their former allies (the secular and democratic reformers) as well as Westerners. The leaders of the Arab Spring movements were initially sympathetic to Islamic radical groups, seeing them as fellow victims of the old dictatorship. Now most of the Arab Spring leaders see the Islamic radicals as more interested in imposing another dictatorship. That is a lost cause but is proving to be a rather bloody one to cope with.

The tolerant attitude towards Islamic radicalism by the new Arab Spring governments is the main reason for the renewed vigor of Islamic terror organizations in the last year. Because of the Arab Spring, Egyptian, Libyan, Syrian, and Tunisian jails were emptied of political prisoners after the rebels replaced the dictators. The freed prisoners included thousands of Islamic radicals, many of them Islamic terrorists who promptly went back to the business of being very bad. In Libya, the liberated Islamic terrorists killed the American ambassador and several of the newly elected officials. In Tunisia, the Islamic terrorists were doing the same, and in Yemen the Islamic radicals allied themselves with tribes that wanted more than the new government could provide and tried (unsuccessfully) to take control of parts of the country.

The uprisings that erupted in Tunisia then continued in Egypt, Libya, and beyond raise questions as to what extent violent groups will attempt to take advantage of further regional destabilization. While effective counter-terrorism efforts gave the illusion of diminishing the immediate threat of terrorism in the region, the spread of violent extremism ideology is striking, with new venues popping up on a daily basis—all exhorting Muslims to join in holy war. North African counter-terrorism strategies have been generally effective in breaking up terrorist cells, but sometimes to the detriment of human rights. States in the region, however, are becoming more aware that heavy-handed measures can backfire, and some of them are focusing on religious education (including Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya) to attempt to prevent people from embracing Salafi Islam (Bartolucci 2013).

Finally, the fear of Islamist radicalism should be re-contextualized. Even if violent components are present in all countries, political Islam in the region has a long history of pacifism. Following the historical repression of Islamists and its consequences, it can be argued that a different approach, based on dialogue and mutual comprehension with secular parties rather than open confrontation, is necessary to avoid a new spiral of violence.

4. Conclusions

Although neither experts nor theorists have predicted the Arab Spring and in many issues regarding the Arabic future their views, analysis and opinions differ, in one all of them agree. The things in Middle East are certainly different than they were in early 2010 and there is no way back. That what happened in several Arab countries starting in 2011 is indeed irreversible process and probably on the end will lead to democracy. If Europe took almost 6 centuries to build democracy the Arab countries will certainly take much less, but the question remains: what kind of democracy? There is still a gap between deferent
movements and political parties that lead the revolutions in finding concrete and unified program agenda required to shape the post-revolutionary political system. The influence of the Islamic ideology in shaping of the system is and it is going to be primary. On the other hand, the absence of civil society and the rule of law is the most serious problem. Due to that, we claim that in the near future these societies cannot pave the way to democracy as practiced by Western civilization. Military structures and remnants of previous regimes also did not disappear after the revolutions. They remain an important factor of influence. In an effort for their existence is not excluded the assumption of a possible internal conflicts (even civil war in Libya), and further destabilizing of the regional and international security. In terms of international security, it must be emphasized that the post-conflict societies with a significant Muslim population have become fertile ground for terrorist cells nesting global jihad movement. It happened in the Balkans, in Asia and there is no reason to expect not to happen in the Arab States. The absence of the rule of law, support of Islamic ideology by political parties, as well as their affiliation with terrorist organizations opens the question of the impact of these states on the international security. Legitimacy of the elected moderate Islamist parties in Arab societies and their connection in the common cause (creating hybrid democracies inspired by Islamic law) certainly will have a direct negative impact on international security and the Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis may again revive. Finally, the Arab Spring proved that although democracy is not a universal reality with universal understanding it is a universal aspiration in terms of rule (desires) of majority.
References

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